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Abstract: This paper reviews the arguments about market foreclosure — as
an incentive for vertical agreements between upstream and downstream
firms — and its effects on welfare. We consider that downstream flrms
compete in quantities in the final good market and upstream firms com
pete in quantities in the intermediate good market. In this context we show
that a vertical agreement must not contemplate market foreclosure, that
is, upstream firms continues participating in intermediate market. Re
garding antitrust policy, we show that even vertical agreements aimed at
increasing input price faced by otherfirms may be positive from thewelfare
viewpoint.
Resumen: Este artículo revisa los argumentos respecto a la cerradura de
mercado, como un incentivo a la formación de acuerdos verticales entre
empresas fabricantes de un productointermedio y empresas fabricantes de
un producto final, y sus efectos en el bienestar. Suponemos que tanto los
fabricantes del producto final como los del producto intermedio compiten
en cantidades en sus respectivos mercados. En este contexto, mostramos
que un acuerdo vertical no debe considerar la cerradura de mercado, esto
es, las empresas continúan participando en el mercado intermedio. Res
pecto a políticas antimonopolio, mostramos que incluso los acuerdos verti
cales enfocados a incrementar el precio de mercado del producto intermedio
pueden ser positivos desde el punto de vista del bienestar.
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1. Introcluction
In a study prepared for the debate on the Economic Competition Bili
in Mexico, Castañeda et al. (1992) argue that one-sided or collusive
vertical practices can have both pro-competitive and anti-competitive
effects. For example, avertical agreement (VA) between a manufacturer
and a retailer is pro-competitive if it reduces the inefficiency of input
markets when these are imperfect. But it can also be anti-competitive
ifit reduces buyers’ access to a supplier andlor limits suppliers’ access
to a buyer. In this case, the input market boses one supplier andlor
buyer, which could increase the input prices and trigger an increase in
the price ofthe final good. This phenomenon is called market foreclo
sure. Therefore the new antitrust law deals with the possibility that
the VAS might be used strategically as a monopolistic practice and have,
therefore, anti-competitive effects.
The theory ofindustrial organization has made progress towards
formalizing the effects ofmarket foreclosure on the competitive struc
ture ofboth downstream and upstream industries and on welfare (see
Tirole, 1988). Specifically, in an industry in which there are both
vertically integrated and vertically unintegrated firms, Salinger
(1988) studies the effect of an increase in the number of integrated
firms on prices. However, he treats integration and foreclosure as
exogenous. Hart and Tirole (1990) and Ordover, Saloner and Salop
(1990) focus on foreclosure rather than on efficiency, with modeis in
which double marginalization does not arise as a motive for vi.’
However, Carlton 2 argues that if the relevance of their results for
policy making is to be considered, double marginalization must be
taken into account because two-part tariffmay not be in use and the
price may exceed marginal cost. Furthermore, as we will see, it is not
necessarily suitablethat the price in a two-parttanffcontract be equal
to unit cost, as Hart and Tirole assume. Furthermore, these authors
assume implicitlythat the trade ofintegrated firms with unintegrated
firms is reduced to selling the input, that is, they do not review the
suitability ofpurchasing input from other manufacturers.
Gaudet and Long (1993) review Salinger’s model considering
vertical integration (vi) incentives and characterize trade amonginte
1 For that purpose, Hart and Tirole assume the possibility oftwo-part tariffin the input’s
market and Ordover, Saloner and Salop assume input price competition and homogeneous input. 2 See Hart and Tirole (1990, pp. 279).
grated and unintegrated firms. These authors show that it may be
optimal for integrated firms to purchase inputs from other manufac
turers as a strategy to increase the cost of rival retailers. However,
they do not analyze welfare effects, and study the more conventional
approach focusing on full collusion. With the exception ofGaudet and
Long (1993), most authors do not give any explanation of why an
integrated firm does not trade with unintegrated firms. Our objective
is to reconsider the arguments regarding market foreclosure, as an
incentive to VA, and its welfare effects. In order to fuiflil this objective,
we model trade among integrated and unintegrated firms with two
part tariff contracts instead of the fuli collusion approach as Gaudet
and Long do. This change allows pricing the intermediate good aboye
or below the unit production cost. 3 We also consider intermediate
market inefficiency, specifically with input market price greater than
marginal cost, 4 as an incentive to VA. We assume Cournot competition
in the final market.
We then consider the conditions under which a manufacturer of
an intermediate good (the “upstream firm”) offers a two-part tariff
contract to a retailer (the “downstream flrm”), as a strategy to avoid
the intermediate market inefficiency and to increase the retailer’s
profits. The manufacturer is able to obtain a share ofthe increase in
the retailer’s profits through the franchise fee. Acceptance of this
contract is known as VA.
The optimality ofoffering this contract depends on the number of
manufacturers and retailers. In other words, it depends on the mag
nitude ofoligopolisticrents (or mark-ups) in theintermediate and final
markets. When the rents in the input market are lower than those in
the product market, that is, when there are more manufacturers than
retailers, we argue that there are always incentives to achieve VAS.
There are three reasons behind this result. First, it is optimal for the
manufacturer to price the contract below the marginal cost. 5 In Cour
not oligopoly, each downstream firm would like to be a Stackelberg
leader but the implicit assumption in the model is that it cannot
commit to such a level of output. The two-part tariff provides the
See Caillaud and Rey (1994) for a survey on delegation contracts.
That is, an upstream firm sets its own mark-up without taking into account the
externalities of its decision on profits of downstream firms who also sets its own mark-up
unilaterally. This phenomenon is known as double marginalization. See Tirole (1988, ch. 4).
5 Vickers (1985) shows the same result, in a firm’s internal organization context imposing a priori market foreclosure.
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necessary commitment by creating a low marginal cost and thereby
making it rational for the downstream firm to produce more than the
Cournot output. Second, as a strategy to increase the rival retailers’
cost, the manufacturer “purchases” inputs from other manufacturers.
The increase in the profits ofthe contracted retailercompensates both,
pricing the contract below the unit production cost of the input and
purchasing inthe market aboye such a cost. Third, there are gains due
to the elimination of double marginalization. On the contrary, when
the oligopolistic rents in the input market are greater than those in
the product market, that is, when there are more retailers than
manufacturers, the rent extraction from other retailers through the
strategies named aboye, are not necessarily enough to compensate
the rent losses due to giving up selling to other retailers.
Regarding policy, we argue that VAS are positive for welfare. The
welfare gains from an increase in the number ofVAS, due to the reduc
tion in double marginalization inefficiency, offset the welfare losses
due to the reduction in the production and the number ofindependent
retailers.
The paperis organized as follows. Webegin bylayingoutthe basic
model in Section 2. The incentives for VAS and their welfare effects are
studied in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
Consider a situation where there are M 2 upstream firms (or manu
facturers) who produce an intermediate homogeneous good at a con
stant unit cost, e, and N 2 downstream firms (or retailers) who need
only one unit of input (the intermediate good) to produce one unit of
the final homogeneous good. The retailers are price-takers in the input
market, where they pay a unit price, h, and compete “a la Cournot” in
the final good market. The manufacturers compete “a la Cournot”
in the intermediate good market. Under this industrial structure the
manufacturers have incentives to negotiate vertical agreements (vAs),
in order to avoid double marginalization inefficiency. 6
Assume that each manufacturer offers to one, and only one,
retailer a two-part tariff contract (w, F) where w is the unit price of
6 It is irrelevant to contemplate the case in which the retailers offer the contract since
they are price-takers in the input market. See Flath (1989, 1991).
the intermediate good and F is the franchise fee. 7 The contract does
not specify a priori market foreclosure, that is, the manufacturer and
the retailer are able to continue purchasing and selling the input in
the market. The contract must satisfy w h. Otherwise, the retailer
would accept to pay an input price greater than the market price ifthe
manufacturer covers the difference. It is not an equilibrium strategy
for the manufacturer to offer this contract because the retailer has
incentives to purchase the input in the market. The retailer accepts
the contract if he gets at least the same profits as those obtained by
purchasingthe input in the market. In this case, we will saythat there
is a VA.
Assume that there are r VAS (that is, r couples of firms have
achieved a vA), n independent retailers and m independent manufac
turers (that is, firms that except through the market do not have any
vertical relationship). We will group them, respectively, in the sets 1,
J and K. Then M = m + r and N = n + r. We will save indexes i,j and
k for variables related to firms in sets 1, J and K, respectively.
We consider a three-stage game. Inthefirst stage VAS are decided.
In the second stage, independent manufacturers and manufacturers
in a VA decide production to seli in the input market, and the second
one decides, simultaneously, production to seli to the retailer with
whom they have a VA. In the third stage the independent retailers and
the retailers in a VA compete in the final good market. As usually, we
solve the model by backward induction.
where p(X) is the final good price and X is the quantity. Facing this
demand, the retailer i e 1 chooses x. to maximize its profits:
II D, = (p — w.) x. — F.. The FOC and profits are given respectively by:
A manufacturer may have incentives to offer a contract to more than one retailer and
increase the price of the intermediate good in order to reduce competition in the final market.
This is obviously a horizontal integration strategic and it is negative for final consumers. It is
not the objective of this paper to analyze horizontal integration strategies.
2.1. Final Market
The final good (inverse) demand is given by:
p = 1 -X (1)
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xj=p—wj=1--X—w (2)
flD=x—F 1 . (3)
The retailer fe J chooses x to maximize its profits:




From (4) and given that ah the independent retailers face the same
cost, the total output produced by them must satisfy:
X= x=nx=n(p—h), (6)
fE J
this quantity defines the demand of the input market. This demand
is satisfied by independent manufacturers whose total production is





From (1), (6), (7) andX=X 1 +X, whereX 1 = x. is the total
iE 1
output produced by retailers into 1, we obtain the (inverse) input
demand:
h=1—(1+1/n)(Z+9)—X 1 (8)
The demand from retailer i e 1 obtained from (1), (2), and (7) and
is given by:
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w=1—Z—O—X 1 —x. (9)
Solving (8) and (9) for h and x, i e 1, we get the input market
demand system:
1 1 r 1
___
— (Z+O)—
w.+ (10) ¿ 1+r 1+r 1+r 1+r
t it E 1
1
—1 (Zo) 1
(11) 1+r n(1+r) 1+rL.d ¿
¿El
The independent manufacturer k e Kfaces the demand (11) and
chooses Zk to maximize its profits: TI U, = (h
— c)zk. The FOC and profits
are given respectively by:
n+r+ 1 h—c= Zk (12) n (r + 1)
n+r+ 1
lEEUk= z (13) n (r+ 1)
Facing demands (10) and (11) the manufacturer i e 1 chooses O to seil in the intermediate market, w. andF for its contracted retailer to maximize:
fl=(h—c)0.+(w—c)x.+F.. (14)
subject to8 w. h and the retailer participation condition:
flD=x 2 _Ffl.D.=x2. (15)
Substituting (15) into (14) and taking into accountthatx depends
The condition w h guarantees that the retailer does not participato in intermediate market. As we will see later, this condition is not binding in equilibrium. The optimality ofthis contract is studied in the first stage ofthe game.
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on h, and h in turn depends on the choices of the rnanufacturers:’° e










1—r 1 wi—c= —xi+—Oi,
and the profits are given by:





Given m, n and r, the second stage (subgame perfect) equilibrium
is characterized by equations (2), (4), (12), (17) and (18). From the
solution ofthis system we obtain:
n+2 r—1 w.—c— x.— x.<0. r r
O. = — (n +2) x <0
So, we can enunciate the next result:
(20)
(21)
Proposition 1. Ifretailers compete “a la Cournot”, an optimal contract
specifies an inputprice lower than the production cost (w <c). Under
this contract, the manufacturer “purchases” the input in the interme
diate market (O < O).
The intuition behind the result is that the contract acts as a
10 The author acknowledges to an anonyinous referee this observation.
commitment device. In Cournot oligopoly, each retailer would like to be a Stackelberg leader but the implicit assumption in the model is that it cannot commit to such a level of output. The two-part tariff provides the necessary comrnitment by creating a Iow marginal cost and thereby making it rational for the retailer to seli more than the Cournot output.”
Alternatively, the optimality ofpricing in the contract below the unit production cost can be explained in terms ofthe slopes ofthe re action function. A reduction in the contract price induces an increase in retailer production. Because the slopes ofthe reaction function are negative (strategic substitutes) the other retailers reduce their pro duction, so the retailer under a contract increases its market share and profits and this profit increment covers the cost of setting the contract price below production cost.
Regarding market foreclosure, proposition 1 indicates that the optimal relation of firms in a VA with independent firms is to “pur chase” the input. This result rnay be understood as a strategy to increase the rivais’ cost (other retailers) and indicates that the in crease in profits induced by this strategy offsets the cost ofpurchasing the input at a greater price than the internal production cost.
It is not difficult to find real-world examples ofthis. Sorne indus trial corporations,with a credit institution amongtheir firms, custorn arily give preferential credits to other firms within the corporation so that the latter can be more competitive in their industrial sector. In international trade, sorne industrial corporations have gone into the United States market purchasing retail chains and selling below production cost, a strategy that has provoked dumping lawsuits.
With vertical integration (which implies that w = c) instead of a
two-part tariff contract, Gaudet and Long (1993) also show the opti mality ofpurchasingtheinput in the case ofa double duopolybilateral
(N = M = 2). In the general case, however, these authors obtain that
the sign of O. is ambiguous and is positive ifthe number ofindependent
firms is small with respect to the number of integrated firms. In this case, when there are relatively few independent rivais, taking away their profits by increasing their costs does not compensate paying a higher price for the input than its production cost. In our case,
11 This is a classical result in literature on pre-commitment effects that assume that delegation contracts, if any, are publicly observed. See Caiflaud and Rey (1994).
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however, the possibility offixing a contract price below its production
cost, raises the positive effect on profits offirrns in a VA induced by the
strategy of increasing rivais’ cost. Then, this positive effect always
offsets the cost of purchasing the input at a higher price than its
production cost.
Now, we analyze whether it is optimal to offer a contract such as the
one defined by (14), (15) and proposition 1 and its welfare effects.
The condition needed to archive an agreement is that net profits of a
firm in a VA exceed profit ofan independent manufacturer. We assurne
that each independent manufacturer considers that n, m, r are given,
then decides to offer a contract to a retailer taking into account that a
new VA reduces the number ofindependent firms. So the condition for
a new VA is:
lET(r) HUk(r
— 1)
It is difficult to derive general propositions regardingthe optimal
ity of a VA, since the solution of the model (giving in the appendix)
depends on complex expressions. For this reason, in order to obtain
sorne conclusions, we have made sorne numerical exercises giving
values to N, M and r from which we conclude:
When there are more manufacturers than retailers there are always
incentives to achieve a vertical agreement. Ifthere are no costs related
to signing averticalagreement, the intermediate market disappears and
the Cournot equilibrium is achieved with Min{N, Ml firms. When there
are more retailers than manufacturers, vertical agreements are not
necessarily achieved.
In other words, a VA decision depends on the magnitude of
oligopolistic rents (or mark-ups) in the intermediate and final mar
kets. The magnitude of oligopolistic rents depends on the number of
firms competing in each market. When there are more (less) manufac
turers than retailers, oligopolistic rents in final market are greater
(lower) than those in intermediate market. So, when the rents are
greater in final market, we argue that there are always incentives to
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achieve VAS, as a strategy of manufactures for rent extraction offinal
market. On the contrary, when the oligopolistic rents in the final mar
ket are lowerthan those in the product market are, the rent extraction
from other retailers through the strategies narned inproposition 1, not
necessarily are enough to compensate the rent losses due to giving up
selling to other retailers.
When the number of manufacturers wanting to integrate is
greaterthan the number ofretailers willing to do so, the manufacturer
that does not find a retailer will be expulsed from the industry. This
implies that before the agreement, there will be sorne cornpetition for
independent retailers. This competition implies that retailers will
have a greater share ofthe surplus ofa VA. In any case, expression (16)
rnaxirnizes the value of the relation without taking into account the
share ofthe surpius ofthe vertical relation.
Finally, we review the effects of the VAS on welfare, which is
defined by:
W=X 2 /2+rH.+ (N—r)FID+(M—r)fl Uk.
That is, the consumer surplus plus industry profits. An increase
in the number of VAS 5 positive from welfare viewpoint if
From numerical exercises, we find that a vertical agreement
always increases welfare. The welfare gains from an increase in the
number of vAs, due to the reduction in double marginalization ineffi
ciency, offsets the welfare losses due to the reduction in the production
and number ofindependent retailers.
4. Conclusions
Tu this work we reconsidered the argurnents regardingforeclosure and
according to our results, at least under the industrial structure as
sumed by other similar modeis, there are no reasons for firrns in a VA
to deny participation in the intermediate market. In fact, trade arnong
firms in a VA with independent flrms is an incentive to achieve a VA,
since it can be used strategically to gain greater profits. Regarding
antitrust policy, we show that even monopolization atternpts can be
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positive from a welfare viewpoint, since a manufacturer who desires From Al and A4 into X Z + O +X 1 , we get:
a greater rnarket share sets prices in a contract below rnarket price.
Our conclusions recover sorne arguments (see Tirole, 1988, X = (r 2 + (n + r (n + 2)) (1 —a 1 )) (p
— c), A5 pp. 170; Mathewson and Winter, 1987) that hoid that the observed
vertical controis have as a unique goal to increase the efficiency of and from p — c = 1 — c — X into A5: the vertical relations — not monopolization. In this work we establish
sorne conditions that support these argurnents allowing final market




1 +r + (n + r (n + 2)) (1 —a 1 )
In this appendix we solve the equilibrium specified by equations (2), Then the equilibrium is given by: (4), (12), (17), (18). Given that the manufacturers cost are equal, then
Z=mzk,Xf_rxj,andO=r0j.So,from( 7 ): ,= (,.+ (n+2)(1+a 1 ))a 2 (1_c)>0
Z+O=mz+r0=n(p—h) Al x=(l—a 1 )a 2 (1—c)>0
From (12) and (20) into Al we get: O. = — (n + 2) (1 —a 1 )a 2 (1 — e) <0
p—h=(1—a 1 )(p—c) w—c=—(r—1+ (n+2)(1—a 1 )cx 2 )(1—c)<0
where:
n (r + 1)
Zk n+r+ 1
a 1 a 2 (1—c)>0 1 a 1
= 1 +a 0 ’
X= (1—cx 2 )ÇI—c)
mn(1+r)
and the equilibrium profits by: a 0 = (n(l+r)+2r)(n+r+l)
H.= (r+ (n+1)(1—a 1 ) 2 )a 2 (1—c) 2 So, from (4) and A2:
x=p—h=(1—a 1 )(p—c). A3 HUk=
n(r+1)
n + r +
1 aa (1 —c) 2
Now, from (2), (19) and A3, we get:
flD=(l—a 1 ) 2 a(l—c) 2
= (r + (n + 2) (1 — ai)) (P
— e). A4
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Los nuevos factores
de localización industrial
en México. La experiencia de los
complejos automotrices
de exportación en el norte
José Carlos Ramírez*
Resumen: El objetivo de este documento es ofrecer evidencia sobre los
nuevos factores de localización asociados con el reciente emplazamiento de
empresas automotrices exportadoras en el norte de México. Los resultados
aquí reportados apoyan la hipótesis de que la naturaleza de esos factores
se explica por el interés de las empresas de aplicarintensivamentesistemas
flexibles de producción y no solamente —como es la visión tradicional—por
su deseo de explotar los llamados factores weberianos. Las conclusiones del
estudio son relevantes tanto para la teoría de la organización industrial
como para el diseño de políticas industriales, pues además de que sugieren
la ampliación de miras de los modelos espaciales heredados de la economía
regional, muestran los riesgos de continuar apoyando políticas industriales
tradicionales basadas en los subsidios o gastos en infraestructura.
Abstract: This paper aims to explain the new location factors which are
associated with the recent establishment of export-oriented motor plants
in the North ofMexico. The findings supportthe hypothesisthat some types
ofplants, such as the automotive export companies studied here, are more
interested in applying flexible production systems than in taking acivanta
ge ofthe Weberian industrial location determinants. The study concludes
that industrial organization theory is relevant in the design of industrial
policy, while at the same time recognizing the need to broaden and to
reformulate location modeis inherited from Regional Economics. Ofparti
cular importance is the need to recognize the high risks for failure in
continuing to follow traditional industrial policies based on production
subsidies andlor for the provision by government agencies of dedicated
infrastructure.
División de Economía, dDE. El autor agradece los comentarios de Raphael Kaplinsky (Sussex University), Stephen Meardon (U. ofDuke), Andrés Zamudio (CmE) y de dos dictamina dores anónimos. Los errores que aún persistan son de mi exclúsiva responsabilidad.
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